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Abstract: The article analyses governance difficulties at Fagor Electrodomésticos, for decades the 
world’s largest industrial cooperative, and sheds light on how the cooperative model and governance 
might have contributed to the firm’s bankruptcy. The case study examines how the cooperative 
model influenced the speed and quality of decision making. The roles of the main cooperative 
governing bodies (the General Assembly, Governing Council and Social Council) are evaluated and 
their limitations to effectively supervise and work with management to make difficult strategic 
decisions. Several governance improvement measures are proposed in order to help other large 
cooperatives combine democratic control and economically sound governance. 
 
Keywords: Organisational failure; Cooperative degeneration; Cooperatives; Mondragon; 
governance 
Introduction 
For the conventional capitalist firms, the academic theoretical and empirical literature on the study of 
the governance bodies is prolific. For example, there are many well-known theoretical handbooks on 
this topic (e.g. Clarke, 2004; Solomon, 2007), together with widely referenced empirical works (e.g. 
Daily and Dalton, 1994; Heath and Norman, 2004).  
Conversely, the governance of co-operatives, and in particular of worker cooperatives, is relatively 
under researched in the scholarly field, with a scarcity of both theoretical and empirical works. There 
are a set of works which have analyzed more or less tangentially this issue (e.g. Cornforth et al., 
1988; Pencavel, 2013; Storey et al., 2014), but with few exceptions (e.g. Cornforth, 1995; Bakaikoa 
et al., 2004), these works either have not been focused on this topic as a key factor or have not 
adopted an empirical approach. Nevertheless, in recent years there has been a growing academic 
interest in the governance of cooperatives, and studies on the failure of large cooperatives, such as 
Canadian agricultural cooperatives (Fulton and Hueth, 2009; Fulton and Larson, 2009a, 2009b) and 
the near melt down of the UK Co-operative Group (Birchall, 2014a; Davis 2014; Myners 2014), 
have highlighted corporate governance difficulties as a key source for failure.  
3 
 
In recent years, the bankruptcy of Mondragon’s flagship Fagor Electrodomésticos S. Coop.1 (FED) 
has attracted scholarly attention (e.g. Alzola et. al. 2015; Errasti et al., 2017; Arando and Bengoa, 
2018; Bretos et al., 2018; Basterretxea et al., 2019). Yet, these studies have focused predominantly 
on external factors, largely ignoring how those responsible for governance of the cooperative 
attempted to deal with these problems. While not denying the importance of external factors, this 
paper tries to increase our understanding of the potential challenges of the worker cooperative model, 
shedding light on how FED’s cooperative model and governance contributed to the firm’s 
bankruptcy. Special emphasis is placed on analysing how the cooperative model influenced the speed 
of decision making and the adoption of painful decisions. The paper also evaluates the role of the 
main cooperative governing bodies (the General Assembly, Governing Council and Social Council) 
and their limitations to make key strategic decisions and effectively supervise and work with 
management. Several governance improvement measures are proposed.  
The article is structured as follows. The next section sets out the context of the case study and 
reviews the relevant literature. The third section discusses the research methods used. The fourth 
section summarizes the main findings of the study. The final section presents a discussion of the 
findings and the conclusions of the article. 
Case study’s context and literature review  
In 2013 the world’s biggest industrial worker owned cooperative, and Europe’s fifth-largest maker of 
household appliances, FED, collapsed. The demise of FED gained international media attention not 
only in those countries where its factories where located (Spain, France, Poland, Morocco and 
China), but also in the world’s leading economic journals. This media attention was due to FED’s 
size and to its symbolic role as a model and launching platform for many other co-operatives that 
now make up the Mondragon Group. "This group comprises close to 264 firms, 98 of them co-
operatives and has 81,837 employees and a total revenue of 11,936 million euro (Mondragon, 2019). 
The largest Mondragon cooperative is the retailer Eroski, with 30,903 employees in 2018, one third 
of them worker members. A large network of industrial firms producing goods in different sectors 
employed 38,772 people in 2018, 14,455 of them in non-cooperative subsidiaries. Mondragon’s 
                                                           
1
 There are several Mondragon cooperatives that share the “Fagor” name and brand that are still trading 
successfully, such as Fagor Arrasate, Fagor Automation, Fagor Ederlan, Fagor Electrónica and Fagor 
Industrial. We use FED only to refer to Fagor Electrodomésticos S. Coop. 
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industrial and service firms gravitate around what Roche et al. (2018) define as “core elements”. This 
core is comprised of an Education network (Mondragon University and several vocational training 
and management training centres); 15 research centres; Lagun Aro, the Social Security entity, and 
Laboral Kutxa, the bank of the corporation. Mondragon differs from other corporations since power, 
authority and ownership is decentralized in a “federal” or “inverted pyramid” organisational 
structure. A consequence of this is that “any co-op that does not find that the Mondragon corporate 
offices are adding value to their operations may secede at any time” (Smith 2001, p. 28), as was the 
case with Irizar and Ampo in 2008. This “inverted pyramid” structure of autonomous cooperatives 
that cooperate voluntarily has also been argued by Mondragon managers to elude group 
responsibilities in the trials that followed the bankruptcy of FED.  
During previous recessions Mondragon cooperatives had better relative performance compared to 
ordinary firms (Arando et al., 2015; Basterretxea and Albizu, 2010; Bradley and Gelb, 1987; Morris, 
1992) and a low failure rate (Arando et al., 2015; Ellerman, 1984; Smith, 2001). Thus, the failure of 
FED came as a shock. Five years later, many post-closure lessons seem to have been learnt in the 
group, with evidence of its inner strength and resilience. It is worth mentioning, for example, the key 
role of Mondragon’s mechanisms of inter-cooperation which have helped to strongly mitigate the 
effects of the employment crisis generated by the collapse of FED (Arando et al., 2018).   
Business failure literature and FED 
Business failure literature presents two conflicting views on the cause of closure: the deterministic 
and voluntaristic perspectives (Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004; Amankwah-Amoah, 2016). The 
deterministic perspective attributes business closure to environmental factors over which 
management has limited control. The voluntaristic perspective attributes business closure to factors 
arising from within the firm. Failure is caused by management decisions and lack of competency to 
reverse the decline caused by external factors (McGovern, 2007).  
To a great extent, the deterministic perspective has guided many of the analyses of academics trying 
to explain FED’s demise (Alzola et al. 2015; Errasti et al. 2016; Arando and Bengoa, 2018). Those 
researchers, together with many voices in business-related media, resorted to defend the cooperative 
model based on a simple analogy: in the same way that many corporations went bankrupt with the 
economic crisis and the capitalist business model was not called into question; the bankruptcy of a 
cooperative, however emblematic, should not call into question the viability of the cooperative 
model. FED did not go bankrupt either because of its cooperative model or because of poor 
5 
 
management, but because of an exceptional fall in its main markets. In other words, due to purely 
external factors. Environmental factors most commonly mentioned are Spain’s property bust and 
subsequent fall in the sale of appliances; new low-cost competition from China and Turkey and the 
entrance of aggressive Korean competitors in the mid-range market. 
This complacent view contrasts with a critical analysis conducted internally by the Mondragon 
corporation (Ortega and Uriarte, 2015) more in line with the voluntaristic school. This internal 
analysis points towards many cooperative model and cooperative governance failures, 
mismanagement and internal communication problems. Similarly, the bankruptcy administrator, 
considers not only environmental factors as the cause of failure, but also internal ones such as “not 
following the same path as competitors by moving production to low cost countries, thus being 
unable to adapt prices to market needs, something that generated a reduction of sales and generated 
losses” or the “high debt leverage motivated mainly by the acquisition of the French firm Brandt and 
by the negative results of the main subsidiaries that asked for new investments”  (Insolvency 
Administrator, 2014). Responsibility for these decisions lies with managers and governance bodies 
responsible of overseeing management. For example, buying Brandt through massive borrowing was 
proposed by managers, but then approved by 82% of members in the General Assembly. Not 
following the same rate of delocalization of production was also a decision conditioned by the 
governance bodies. 
  
Literature on corporate governance in co-operatives   
In this paper we define organisational governance as the ‘systems and processes concerned with 
ensuring the overall direction, control and accountability of an organization’ (Cornforth, 2004, 
2012). At the organisational level the body with the main responsibility for ensuring governance 
functions are carried out is the organisation’s board or governing body. However, it is important to 
remember that other actors may contribute to carrying out governance functions, such as 
shareholders or members at annual general meetings, board sub-committees and any advisory 
groups, and senior managers. 
A variety of competing theories have been proposed to try to understand the role of boards in the 
private sector (Hung, 1998). The two most dominant theories are agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Keasey et al, 1997), and stewardship theory (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). Agency 
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theory assumes that the owners of an enterprise (the principal) and those that manage it (the agent) 
will have different interests. Hence the owners or shareholders of any enterprise face a problem that 
managers are likely to act in their own interests rather than the shareholders. From this perspective 
the main function of the board is to oversee management, to ensure they act in the shareholders best 
interests. Consequently, board members should have the knowledge, skills and experience to monitor 
and, if necessary, control the behaviour of management. In contrast stewardship theory starts from 
opposite assumptions to agency theory. It assumes that managers want to do a good job and will act 
as effective stewards of an organisation’s resources. Hence, the main function of the board is not to 
ensure managerial compliance with shareholders/members interests, but to support and work with 
management to improve organisational performance. From this perspective board members should 
have background and expertise to support top management and add value to the organisation's 
decision-making. 
However, taken individually these different theoretical perspectives are rather one dimensional, only 
illuminating a particular aspect of the board’s role. This has led to calls among corporate governance 
researchers for approaches that can help integrate the insights of these different perspectives (Hung, 
1998: 108-9; Tricker, 2000: 295; Cornforth, 2004). One such approach is offered by Sundaramurthy 
and Lewis (2003) in a theoretical paper that draws on both agency and stewardship theories to 
suggest the role of the board is paradoxical, that boards must both control and support management. 
Their approach highlights important dysfunctions that can occur in the relationship between boards 
and management. They argue that organisations may experience a cycle of decline if boards put too 
much emphasis on either control or support roles. Too much stress on support can lead to groupthink 
where management ideas and strategies are not adequately scrutinised and challenged. This can lead 
to strategic persistence in good times and a cycle of organisational decline as performance 
deteriorates. Conversely, too much emphasis on control can lead to a separation of responsibilities 
between the board and management, and defensive attitudes where management feel unfairly 
criticised. If this persists increasing levels of distrust may reinforce defensive attitudes hampering 
communication and mutual learning, which can again lead to a cycle of organisational decline.  
Tensions and challenges in co-operative governance 
As well as the dysfunctions highlighted above co-operatives may face other tensions and challenges 
resulting from their particular form of governance. A key principle of co-operatives is that they 
should be governed democratically by their members based on the principle of one member one vote 
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(Cornforth, 2004; Novkovic, 2008). Importantly, any member can put himself or herself forward for 
election as a board member.  Expertise may be desirable but is not a central requirement, as is 
suggested by other perspectives on governance discussed above. As a result, boards may lack the 
skills and experience to effectively oversee management and contribute to decision-making. 
There are other important differences between co-operatives and public companies which are likely 
to make it more difficult for co-operative members to exert control over management (Spear, 2004), 
or support senior management and add value to their proposals. In agency theory it is assumed that 
the main interest of shareholders is to maximise profitability and that the market in corporate control, 
such as pressure from major shareholders or the threat of takeover, as well as board monitoring, will 
help to keep managers aligned to this goal. In co-operatives members, as owners, are the principles, 
but in co-operatives’ shares are not traded in a market and members only have one vote irrespective 
of the number of shares they hold. Hence there are not the same pressures on managers to perform, 
such as pressure from major shareholders or the threat of takeover (O’Sullivan and Diacon, 2003).  
In co-operatives the members collectively have overall control of the organisation. Small co-
operatives often practice direct democracy with the general meeting of members taking important 
decisions, but as co-operatives grow this is usually not practical. A variety of studies suggest that 
participation rates of members tend to decline as co-operatives age and grow (Chaves et al, 2008; 
IFA, 2006; Spear, 2004; Lees and Volkers, 1996) and that general meetings are not an effective 
arena for members to influence decision-making, with deliberations usually limited to approving the 
annual accounts and reports (Mozas, 2004: Chaves et al, 2008). 
This suggests that for larger co-operatives representative democracy in the form of an elected board 
is the most important means that members have of trying to either control managerial behaviour or 
improve management decisions, but at as noted above these boards may lack the expertise and skills 
to exercise effective influence (Chaves et al. 2008; IFA, 2006, Lees and Volkers, 1996). This 
problem is highlighted by Sivertsen (1996: 35) a senior manager in a Norwegian consumer co-
operative: 
‘Co-ops tend to be management driven. Whereas board members in major private companies 
are elected within the business environment, board members in co-ops are elected among 
what we would call everyday people. Very often solid, earnest people with good judgement, 
but without the necessary background to make strategic decisions in the business world.’ 
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More recently several studies of credit, consumer and agricultural co-operatives that have 
experienced crises or failure have pointed to weak governance by boards lacking the necessary skills 
and experience to adequately scrutinise management proposals (Fulton and Larson, 2009a and b; 
Birchall, 2014a; Myners, 2014). 
In worker co-operatives differences in expertise may be less of a problem than other forms of co-
operative as the members work in the co-operative. However, as worker co-operatives grow and 
employ professional managers it is likely that the gap in expertise between workers and management 
will grow. Batataille-Chedotel and Huntzinger (2004) in a study of French worker co-operatives 
suggest that once co-operatives grow to have more than 250 members boards do not have the 
competency to make strategic decisions. Previous studies on FED indicate that governance problems 
derived from co-operative members low business literacy and inability to understand financial 
information have been present in previous decades. Greenwood and González et al. (1989) found that 
FED co-operators felt that they were inundated with accounting data, business plans, technical and 
production information; information that co-operators were not able to understand. At the same time, 
many cooperative members also believed that key information was being kept from them. 
(Greenwood and González et al. 1989, 145-149). Similarly, Whyte and Whyte (1988, p. 227) 
wondered whether the members of FED were suffering from information overload and “given a 
larger and more complex volume of information than most are able to absorb”. A decade later, 
Kasmir (1996) also found that many cooperative members of FED were frustrated and complained 
that they were unable to understand and make effective use of the information they received. “All 
members of the cooperative are given a great deal of information, which they simply cannot get 
through. Social Council members who make the effort to synthesize the material, often find they need 
help interpreting information” (Kasmir, 1996, 138).  
The incorporation of independent members onto cooperatives’ governing bodies has the potential to 
bring relevant expertise and different external perspectives to strengthen the organisations’ decision 
making (Johanson and Østergren, 2010). A study of the governance of 60 large cooperatives in six 
different industries conducted by Birchall (2014b) found that around half of the 60 boards had 
appointed independent board members and he expected more cooperatives to follow. However, this 
was not the case at FED.  
In addition, the boards of co-operatives may experience other problems besides a lack of skills. Low 
participation rates by members in elections may mean boards are not representative of the wider 
membership (Spear, 2004; Chaves et al, 2008). This problem can be exacerbated in worker co-
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operatives if they employee non-worker members. Further challenges can arise when board members 
feel they are on the board to represent and defend the interests of particular groups of workers or 
members rather than work with management to further the best interests of the co-operative as a 
whole (Cornforth, 2004). 
 
FED and its main governance bodies 
Created in 1956 by five ex-students from a technical college in Mondragon to produce heating 
devices, FED soon expanded its production to other home appliances. Besides being economically 
successful, this worker cooperative helped in the creation of many new cooperatives in the 1960s and 
1970s that nowadays are part of the Mondragon Group. After three decades of internal growth, in 
1989 FED began a process of external acquisition with the takeover of Fabrelec-Edesa, a Spanish 
competitor in crisis with 790 employees. While employees of this firm were offered the possibility of 
becoming cooperative members, this option was not given to workers of foreign firms acquired 
afterwards (Errasti et al. 2016).  
In 1994 FED opened a factory in Morocco. In 1996 it created a joint venture, Geyser-Gastech, with 
the German firm Vaillant. Then, in 1999 it bought 76% of the Polish white goods company 
Wrozamet (then FED-Mastercook), with 1,760 employees. In 2001 it created a joint venture in China 
(Shangai Minidomesticos Cookware Co Ltd) to produce pressure cookers. In 2005 it bought a 
kitchen furniture manufacturer, Grumal, with 400 employees. Finally, in 2005, FED made its biggest 
acquisition, Brandt Electroménager, the French leader in household appliances, with 4,700 
employees.  
This process of non-cooperative growth abroad converted FED into what Errasti et al. (2016) call a 
“coopitalist multinational” with 18 production plants in six countries, a workforce of 10,543 
employees at the peak of its growth in 2006 and a complex structure as can be seen in Figure 1. 
(Insert Figure 1 about here) 
A quick glance at the structure highlights the complexity of decisions that rank and file members in 
the General Assembly and those serving in the Governing Council had to face. Besides its many 
production units in Spain and abroad, FED had nineteen subsidiary commercial firms in different 
countries; seven firms devoted to provide after sales and customer services; several firms to provide 
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internal services such as R&D and a portfolio of twelve different brands aimed at reaching different 
countries and market niches. 
FED financed its internal and external growth strategies through borrowing, and when the financial 
crisis broke in 2008 and the market for home appliances in its main markets collapsed the company 
entered a sharp decline that finished with bankruptcy proceedings in November 2013, (Molina, 2012; 
Errasti et al, 2016).  
The main governing bodies of the cooperative were the General Assembly of all members, and the 
elected Governing Council and Social Council. The General Assembly is the supreme body in the 
cooperative. Each cooperative member has one vote in the Assembly, regardless his/her position in 
the firm and regardless his/her investment. Formally it votes on the annual business plan, allocates 
profits, decides on mergers and acquisitions, votes on the admission of new members and the 
expulsion of any members, elects the Governing Council and monitors its performance (Kasmir, 
1996, 36). In the case of FED, given its particular corporate culture, the General Assembly also 
decided on many other minor issues, as the results section shows. 
The Governing Council in FED was made up of 12 members elected by the General Assembly for 
four years. The Governing Council appoints and oversees senior managers, prepares annual plans, 
determines job classifications, presents annual reports and accounts to the General Assembly and 
proposes the distribution of profits for the approval of the General Assembly (Kasmir, 1996: 36).  
The Social Council, whose members are elected by the General Assembly, brings grievances to 
management on behalf of workers (such as concerning health and safety, job ratings, work pace, job 
assignments, recruitment and promotion criteria; pay policy, work schedules, relocations or pay 
policy). Besides, the Social Council communicates managerial decisions and conveys information 
downward (Kasmir, 1996: 37). Social Council members are elected from the different factories, 
departments or sections where they work. While other big Mondragon cooperatives have maintained 
a low number of members in their Social Councils (between 12 and 16), internal bylaws of FED 
established a minimum of 40 and a maximum of 60 members. Besides being large, as will be shown, 
the power of the Social Council at FED went far beyond its formal remit. 
 
Methods  
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Due to the complex and interwoven characteristics of this study topic we adopted an exploratory 
qualitative methodology (e.g. Glesne, 2006). This aimed to contextualize and interpret the case 
following an abductive reasoning perspective, with an interactive engagement between empirical 
material and theory (Dew, 2007; Sinkovics and Alfoldi, 2012). The research drew on three main 
sources of information. First, public information available on the collapse of FED, such as 
journalistic reports, public corporate reports and information from the judicial process into the 
collapse of the company. Secondly, there was access to relevant internal reports from the cooperative 
and the corporation. Thirdly, a series of in-depth interviews were carried out with different 
stakeholders involved in the collapse of FED.  
We conducted 30 interviews  between October 2015 and December 2018, with a cross section of 
people involved with the cooperative in a variety of roles, that aimed to improve the reliability and 
richness of the information gathered (Miles et al., 2014) and cover the diverse interests at play 
(Glesne, 2006). A total of three interviewers, two of the co-authors of this article plus a research 
assistant, contributed to the data collection using a semi-structured script, which was further 
modified as the fieldwork progressed (Denzin and Lincoln, 2008). The script followed certain pre-
determined general themes related to the case but allowed space for free-flowing discussions. 
Interviewees were identified using a combination of theoretical, purposive and snowball sampling 
(Patton, 2002). All in all, 15 senior executives (3 of them also representatives of the Governing 
Council and 2 of them also members of the Social Council for different periods of time); 6 rank and 
file worker owners, including 3 leading representatives of the Social Council for the last 25 years of 
the firm; a senior union official who defended non-owner employees during the bankruptcy process; 
4 senior managers in the Mondragon central offices; and 4 senior Basque Government officials 
responsible for industrial policy. Most of the managers and rank and file employees interviewed 
worked for FED for at least 20 years. Similarly, the external stakeholders were also very closely 
linked to FED and Mondragon for long periods of time. It was decided to stop soliciting new 
interviews when few new contributions and insights were being obtained, giving rise to theoretical 
saturation (Miles et al., 2014). 
In order to mitigate organisational silence (Morrison and Milliken, 2000) and potential social 
desirability bias (Nederhof, 1985), we asked interviewees for their personal insights, assuring them 
of anonymity. The interviews were carried out in Spanish and Basque — the later was used in order 
to attain closer proximity between the interviewer and interviewee, as suggested in Heras-
Saizarbitoria et al., (2013). The interviews varied in length from 90 to 170 minutes and were 
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recorded and transcribed verbatim. Before the fieldwork the interviewers discussed possible 
methodological distortions and biases related to interviewing people about  a traumatic personal 
experience, for example using the interview to primarily ‘tell his/her story’ as a form of catharsis 
(Heras-Saizarbitoria, 2014), A distortion mentioned by Greenwood and González. (1989) in their 
study of FED. In general, with a few exceptions, the interviewers did not find that this was a 
significant problem. 
Public information available on the collapse of FED was also analysed, including journalistic 
accounts, the different strategic plans of the company and discussion documents, and conclusions of 
the insolvency administrator. In addition, very extensive internal corporate data related to FED over 
extended periods of time were gathered. This included specific reports to address the crisis, internal 
working documents presented to various governing bodies and strategic plans and annual 
management plans for different periods. 
The information from these three sources was triangulated and analyzed as suggested in the literature 
(e.g. Creswell 2003; Miles et al, 2014). Data was analyzed through constant comparison and 
interpretation (Silverman, 2006). As a result of the iterative process of interpretation, discussion and 
explanation (Glesne, 2006; Silverman, 2006) carried out by the three researchers, the following two 
main problems of governance at FED were evidenced: the delay and challenges in making difficult 
decisions; the lack of expertise of the governing bodies. These two issues are analyzed in depth in the 
following section of the article. 
Results  
While this paper focuses on governance issues, other relevant factors affecting FED’s demise were 
raised in our interviews. Environmental factors, such as the burst of Spanish property bubble and the 
consequent drop in sales of household appliances, the increased bargaining power of big retailers, the 
growing market share of new entrants from Korea, China  and Turkey with cheaper products and 
better quality-price ratios, or the increased competitive rivalry of big players such as Bosch and 
Siemens. Those factors, in particular the burst of the property bubble, have been analysed in previous 
papers on FED’s failure (Alzola et al. 2015; Errasti et al. 2016; Arando and Bengoa, 2018), but 
despite the gravity of these external factors, most interviewees highlighted that the roots of FED’s 
problems were already present at least a decade before the 2008 crisis. 
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Even before the bursting of the property bubble, in those years of extraordinary growth, interviewees 
noted that FED was losing market share (from 24.7% of the Spanish market in 2000 to 18.4% in 
2007), obtained very low profit margins, lost huge amounts of money in some of its business units 
and uncompetitive domestic plants (e.g. the unit producing fridges had lost money for many years 
and lost 14.5 million euro only in 2004). The firm also faced important quality problems before the 
crisis, which it found difficult to fix (e.g. after launching its Innova fridge in 2003, 30% of its units 
sold in the following three years were returned by its customers due to quality problems). 
Interviewees also highlighted long lasting human resource problems that became chronic, such as 
high absenteeism, nepotistic recruitment and selection practices and the low commitment of 
members (see Basterretxea et al., 2019). 
Above all, interviewees blamed poor decisions about relevant investments made between the mid-
1990s and 2007 as the main root of the firm’s death. In this period FED invested heavily in renewing 
its Basque factories and buying the French competitor Brandt. As a consequence, in 2012 FED 
concentrated only 32% of its production in low labour cost regions, compared to 50% at Bosch, 55% 
at Whirpoool, 62% at Electrolux, 70% at LG and Samsung or 100% at Arcelik-Beko, Haier and 
Vestel. In addition, FED’s investments in Spain, Poland and France were financed by borrowing, 
creating huge financial problems when demand began to fall. Behind those decisions (and also 
behind the decisions that were postponed or never made) interviewees highlighted the central role of 
the governing bodies. 
 
Delay in making decisions  
The interviewees pointed out that the characteristic cooperative consultative process entailed slow 
and often difficult decision-making, a slowness that became more pronounced as FED grew in size 
and complexity 
 "Very slow, everything was very slow. The cooperative model is already slow, because it 
requires democratic decision-making. To the extent that every type of decision has to go 
through different groups, different meetings, today you present it, next week you adjust it 
again, the following week you wait for an opinion from the Social Council, then another 
opinion, then it ends in a General Assembly...”. (FED manager, GC and SC member) 
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What was seen as more problematic than the delay in decision-making was that some decisions were 
never made. Although the management and the worker members of FED were aware that some 
business units were running at a loss for more than a decade, the cooperative’s governing bodies did 
not discuss the closure of unprofitable plants in Mondragon, since managers presumed the 
cooperative members would not vote in favour of closing the plants where they were working. 
"Everybody talked about closing refrigerators, but they never actually considered closing it, 
because it provided almost 700 jobs that would be lost in Mondragon... They would have 
stopped being members of FED. That vote never came about, and if it had, it would never 
have succeeded." (FED Manager. Member of the SC) 
"The refrigerator business lost 11 million a year on its own. We should have made decisions 
such as closing it 10 years before; closing what was unprofitable, closing it definitively. But 
here, at the time when we should have closed them (10 years ago), we had 600 cooperative 
members just in the refrigerator plant. It's a bit difficult to make people understand that a 
business is dying and that it is best to just kill it. (…) The management was sure we had to go 
there, they knew what needed to be done, but things were very slow.” (FED Manager. 
Member of GC and SC) 
Not only the executives interviewed, but also the members of the Social Council recognized their 
responsibility in not making difficult decisions. 
"In the Social Council we knew that refrigerators was in a bad way for a very long time. 
Refrigerators was bringing us down significantly and Fagor Mueble was a total disaster. The 
Governing Council informed the Social Council that refrigerators was bringing us down. And 
in the social part, from the left, (we were) great defenders of the jobs above everything else. 
…We put pressure on the Governing Council and that is a despicable way to win, because we 
said: we are going to defend the jobs in the General Assembly and we knew that we would 
win that vote.... And there, in the social part we were all wrong. It's a huge part of our 
guilt.”. (Social Council Member) 
Other hard decisions were also taken too slowly, in the eyes of the interviewees. The employment 
policy of FED and other Mondragon cooperatives in times of crisis is characterized by flexibility in 
work schedules, salaries and job duties, as well as the relocation of members from cooperatives in 
crisis to those in need of manpower. The Insolvency Administrator's report (2014) notes that these 
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measures to reduce costs to adapt to the market "were never placed at the forefront, but rather, they 
always dragged behind the negative events."  
These problems were exacerbated by traumatic changes in the company's top management. In 2006, 
the CEO proposed the first measures for wage reductions and unpaid overtime, but these were not 
accepted by the General Assembly, who also dismissed the CEO. This dismissal and the subsequent 
mass resignation of the entire Governing Council generated a reverse dominance hierarchy in which 
hard decisions were slowed down in order to preserve social peace (Basterretxea et al. 2019). Thus, 
some interviewees believe 2006-2010 was a lost period: 
"From 2005 to 2010 we lost precious time. I think it was a time when we should have done 
things differently. And I don't know if we would have managed to save the company, but at 
least we would have generated a different culture from the one we started from when we 
began the relocations, (a culture of opposition to relocations and adjustments)". (FED 
Manager) 
 
Governing bodies not qualified for the size and complexity of the business 
General Assembly  
The members of FED are eligible to take part in the co-operative’s General Assembly on the 
principle of one member, one vote. Interviewees highlight that attendance at assemblies in the 1990s 
and 2000s was generally low and only increased when salaries or austerity measures to address the 
crisis were discussed. Low participation rates were considered by some interviewees as a worrying 
indicator of members’ commitment, apathy, and lack of co-responsibility.  
"People do not feel they are members, they do not assume that they are members, but they 
talk about democracy. No. Participatory democracy is also a matter of co-responsibility, and 
that co-responsibility is not felt. If it was not a salary issue, or a strong issue, people did not 
go to the General Assembly. So, where is the democratic participation and where is this 
question of co-responsibility? I don't accept it.” (Social Council Member) 
FED’s Corporate Governance Reports prior to 2007 do not show the participation rates of members 
in the General Assembly, but figures from 2007 and 2008 in table 1 offer numerical evidence of very 
low attendance rates. Some rank and file interviewees said that many members signed at the entrance 
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to the General Assembly but immediately left without attending the debates and voting. Those 
behaviours are in line with the findings of Arregi et al. (2018) in another Mondragon cooperative 
(ULMA Archiuitectural Solutions), who found that workers had a moderately negative opinion of 
adherence to cooperative ownership practices. 
 Table. 1. Evolution of participation of members in General Assemblies of FED 
 15/5/2007 13/5/2008 4/11/2008 13/5/2009 25/11/2009 11/5/2010 10/5/2011 15/5/2012 27/11/2012 
Working 
members 
voting in the 
General 
Assembly* 
1,029 671 2,411 2,001 1,981 
 
1,501 
 
1,201 1,239 1,599 
Cooperative 
working 
members** 
3,082 2,718 2,718 2,474 2,474 2,325 2,219 2,067 2,067 
Participation 
rate 
33.4% 24.7% 88.7% 80.9% 80.1% 64.6% 54.1% 59.9% 77.4% 
*Figures obtained from Corporate Governance Reports 2007-2012 
**Figures obtained from Annual Reports 2007-2012 
Participation increased significantly after the Extraordinary General Assembly of November 4th 
2008, when members had to vote on whether to renounce their Christmas bonus. Given the parlous 
state of the company, participation rates in subsequent General Assemblies remained high as 
members were asked to vote additional wage cuts and other austerity measures.  
Many of the austerity measures proposed by managers were voted down in the General Assemblies 
of FED’s final 10 years or approved with very small majorities. In the 2006 Assembly the proposal 
to reduce the Christmas bonus by one quarter was rejected by members. Two years later, angry 
exchanges between workers and managers over salary cuts again took place in the General 
Assembly, and in 2008 the cut in the Christmas bonus was finally accepted by a small margin (1,262 
votes in favour and 1,149 against). 
The debates on these austerity measures, both in the General Assembly and in the previous 
preparatory meetings were considered by interviewees to be conflictual and painful, with continuous 
“boos, whistles and tantrums” when managers spoke, and applause when worker members criticized 
managers.   
“The 2006 Assembly was a complete disaster. Constant booing, a disaster. A lot of anger. …. 
A huge brawl. The General Director resigned, he resigned in the next Governing Council. …. 
Then we had another Assembly, after the closure [of FED], in February, in the Amaia 
Theatre, in which an assistant got up to hit the president, and that was very hard.” (FED 
Manager and Member of the GC)  
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Besides conflict, interviewees highlighted that most members in the General Assembly didn’t have 
the knowledge and skills needed to vote on many strategic decisions of a big multinational like FED. 
Although the cooperative did have representative bodies a culture had grown up where anything 
major also went to the General Assembly. Size was often stressed, and many interviewees consider 
that direct democracy in General Assemblies is not well suited to big multinational cooperatives, 
suggesting the need for representative democracy: 
"A cooperative of the size we have had, where we have had more than 3,000 members, is 
ungovernable, it's a mistake. It is difficult for me to renounce the principle of one member one 
vote, but I'm more and more convinced. I will have to learn to delegate my vote to those 
qualified people who can be in a small assembly in which decisions can be made. And if after 
4 years, those people have not convinced me, I will change them. …. That's my opinion after 
this." (FED Manager and Member of GC and SC) 
Some interviewees believe that the slow decision-making and a large part of the conflicts were due to 
the fact that many decisions in FED were made by the General Assembly, and they proposed that in 
larger cooperatives decisions should be concentrated in the Governing Council.  
"In other big Mondragon cooperatives as Eroski the Governing Council is more likely to 
make decisions compared to the Governing Council of the Fagor Group. For example, the 
amount of our salaries or wages was decided at the assembly. Do you have to decide not to 
receive [your salary] at an assembly? (...) Now the Governing Council (of other nearby 
cooperatives) is given greater power for cases such as that of having to carry out harsh 
measures." (FED Manager and member of the General Council). 
It is significant that even those people who had been on the Social Council for long periods and who 
in the past criticized the Governing Council when it made decisions without consulting the General 
Assembly, now advocate giving more power to the Governing Council: 
"Can a company operate by taking everything to the assembly? It's not possible. Especially 
when you have to make economic decisions, present real management plans, people have to 
know the facts. I believe that some decisions should be left in the hands of the Governing 
Council." (Social Council member).  
 Governing Council  
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In theory, any cooperative member can put himself or herself forward for election as a board 
member. In practice, as in most Mondragon cooperatives, half of the members were elected among 
the candidates proposed by the Governing Council itself, and the other half among candidates 
proposed by the Social Council. According to interviewees, the profile of candidates proposed by the 
Governing Council were mainly technicians and middle managers. The Social Council proposed 
both rank and file members and technicians and middle line managers with a ‘fighter profile’ against 
management. According to many interviewees, board members sponsored by the Social Council 
failed to understand their governance role and went to the board meetings wearing their Social 
Council hat, with a behaviour closer to that of a union representative than to that of a board member.  
The greatest deficiency mentioned by all interviewees is that the electoral system produced a 
majority of board members that lacked relevant skills to carry out effective supervision of managers 
and make decisions. This was not only a problem of rank-and file cooperators on the Governing 
Council, but also of middle ranking technicians. Many of our interviewees served as members of the 
Governing Council, and they acknowledge that despite their university degrees and experience, they 
were ill prepared to fulfil their role. All interviewees, including some former members of FED’s 
Governing Council, admit the inability of the majority of members to understand the complex 
business issues presented to them and therefore to question the quality, robustness or completeness 
of the information and the strategies that managers proposed.  
"The training and knowledge of the members of the Governing Council were not sufficient to 
monitor the management team and make decisions... No, no.  (FED Manager and Member of 
GC and SC) 
"Did the members of the Governing Council have the skills to make the decisions they were 
making, to control the managers? No. I don't think so. I don't think so.” (FED Manager) 
 "Until 2010, perhaps four or five of the 12 members of the Governing Council had the 
knowledge to question the executive's approach and to make demands, but the rest was a type 
of member who was not managing these issues on a day-to-day basis and who were distanced 
from these issues. So they cannot make demands (on the management), or debate and say yes 
(to management's proposals). I think there has to be a debate in the Governing Council." 
(FED Manager) 
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Besides their monitoring role, and in line with the assumptions of the stewardship theory (Muth and 
Donaldson, 1998), some managers thought that the Governing Council should help managers to 
improve strategy and add value to top decisions. Those managers felt that FED should have selected 
some independent board members based on their professional expertise, as most corporate 
governance regulations and codes propose. Spanish and Basque laws allow the appointment of up to 
three independent board members, but FED, as most Mondragon cooperatives, relied only in its 
worker members.  
"I missed a much more professionalised Governing Council. I missed having even one 
(independent) member with voice but not vote, but who could guide management. (FED 
Manager) 
A similar electoral system – often with poorly prepared candidates- was used to choose the members 
of many other committees that made important decisions, such as the Appointments and 
Remuneration Committee, Health and Safety Committee, and Job Evaluation Committee. 
Many interviewees highlight that given the inability of board members to monitor managers and 
address important strategic and economic issues, those issues were often squeezed off the board’s 
agenda and unimportant issues were given priority. A similar difficulty to differentiate between the 
domains of the shop floor and higher levels of management occurred in many General Assemblies, 
where many important multi-million euro investment decisions were often made without much 
discussion and debate, while economically trivial and irrelevant issues could provoke lengthy and 
self-destructive debates. Both in the General Assembly and in the Governing Council, many 
members exerted social control over managers on unimportant and trivial matters that should have 
been discussed in other forums or not discussed at all.   
"When a member of the Governing Council asked me about parking, or other minor issues, 
trivial stuff, or about things that should be discussed in the Social Council …, that tells me 
the level of the Governing Council." (FED Manager) 
"The Governing Council is less qualified than a board of directors in a large PLC to enter 
into a true control of management. And it exercises a type of social control and debates that 
are unprofessional and that take up more time than in a conventional private company. 
(...)And that same Governing Council may be ignoring more important decisions that are not 
evaluated and controlled." (Senior Basque Government Official)  
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When members of the Governing Council didn’t understand the information and the robustness of 
the strategies management proposed to them, they simply trusted and rubber-stamped management’s 
proposals and plans without being really convinced, and without engaging in critical and sound 
dialogue. Afterwards, if management proposals turned out to fail and provoked poor economic 
results, the Governing Council would fire the manager. 
"Do I have enough knowledge to discern if we should buy a company like Brandt? Whether it 
is a good strategy or not? What ability do I have to make such a decision? I am more 
involved in other operational issues of the company, so when I am elected to the Governing 
Council and the CEO sells me the internationalisation strategy and the convenience (of 
buying Brandt), I trust him, because this (system) is based on trust." (Member of the GC). 
"The qualification of the Governing Council is a problem in cooperatives that are starting to 
become large and starting to internationalise, like FED. There is always an approach by the 
Governing Council of "I'll let you do it, I don't understand it, but hey, if you (management) 
say so, let's go with it. However, if it doesn't go well, I'm going to ask for your head", and 
that's the only relationship at the end that the Governing Council has with the management 
team." (Senior Basque Government Official) 
In order to overcome the low business literacy of many members serving on its Governing Councils, 
Mondragon cooperatives have made important training efforts. In 2000 Otalora, Mondragon’s 
Corporate Management and Cooperative Development Centre, began to offer a 100-hour course to 
candidates who wanted to become members of cooperatives’ boards (Basterretxea and Albizu, 2010). 
In 2019 Otalora offers three different courses to members of Governing Councils, totalling 88 hours 
of training. In those courses, training on financial topics (such as analysis of financial statements and 
Management Annual Plans) occupies a tiny part of the programme and is not enough to close the 
skill gaps of many board members. Even if Otalora and FED provided additional training to 
members of the Governing Council, most interviewees consider it naive to think the skills gaps of 
many members could be closed by training programmes.   
Some managers, mainly those with marketing responsibilities, stressed another corporate governance 
problem that has not been analyzed in previous research. Most members of FED were industrial 
workers and technicians in its Basque factories. Meanwhile, most people working in sales positions 
in different regional and international sales teams were employees without any ownership rights. 
Thus, the electoral system generated board members who were industrial workers and technicians 
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whose interests prevailed over the global interests of the firm and the interests of other key functional 
departments and stakeholders.   
"A product manager responsible for marketing has to define brands and ranges based on 
what the market demands. That was not the case in FED. … you defined the range according 
to the market needs and then they told you: "Yes, yes, it's fine, but the San Andrés plant needs 
to be fed". From the commercial area we suggested to the Governing Council that if we 
wanted to continue in the market or make money in some businesses,… the manufacturing 
had to go to another country. They didn't even listen! No way!” (FED Manager) 
Given the complexity of the firm in its last years, rank and file workers suggested that not only 
members of the Governing Council, but also top managers lacked the skills to manage the company. 
They stressed that between 2006 and 2013 FED had four different CEOs and four presidents of the 
Governing Council. As Errasti et al. (2017) underline, this management turnover undermined 
effective leadership needed to face strategic challenges. Our interviewees also highlighted that those 
changes often involved changes of many management positions in functional areas, subsidiaries and 
factories. Those replacements took place so often in the last years of the company, that many 
interviewees felt newly appointed managers didn’t have enough time to properly conduct their tasks 
before they were replaced. 
When our interviews took place, most of the managers interviewed were relocated to other 
Mondragon cooperatives, so they could compare the governance problems of FED with those of 
other cooperatives. There was unanimity that board members of other Mondragon cooperatives also 
lack relevant skills to supervise their managers effectively, but that the problems are less severe in 
small cooperatives where board members have to face simpler decisions than in a big multinational 
cooperative like FED. 
When asked how FED managed to overcome two economic crises (in the 1970s and in the 1980s) 
with the same governance structure, several answers were given. Bigger size and complexity of the 
firm in its last years are almost unanimously cited by interviewees as a key answer. The older 
interviewees also point to the existence in the 1970s and 1980s of other governance mechanisms 
used to supervise managers. Back then FED was part of the ULARCO regional group of 
cooperatives and the CEO of ULARCO could oversee managers of the cooperatives who were not 
doing a good job and if necessary propose their replacement. Whyte and Whyte (1988, 159-162) 
offer a detailed account of the measures taken in the crisis that FED faced in 1983. That year, the 
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president of ULARCO questioned the management of FED, called for changing three of the four 
men in top positions and all the plant managers. He proposed a new CEO and many structural 
changes to the governing council of FED. According to interviewees, Mondragon central offices and 
Fagor group didn’t play a similar role in the final crisis of FED. In fact rhetorical questions asking 
“where was Mondragon?” were frequent, criticizing Mondragon for not supervising FED’s managers 
and their decisions properly. The fact that the CEO and the CFO of Mondragon in the last years of 
FED had been promoted from FED, and so didn’t have enough independence to supervise the actions 
and strategies of the firm was also stressed by many interviewees. 
Older interviewees also highlight the supervisory role of the entrepreneurial division of Laboral 
Kutxa (the bank of Mondragon) in the crises of the 1970s and 1980s when it replaced many 
managers of cooperatives in crisis (see Cheney, 1999; Ellerman, 1984;: Morris, 1992; Whyte and 
Whyte, 1988). This entrepreneurial division of the bank disappeared in 1991 and the supervisory role 
of the corporate bank became secondary when Laboral Kutxa was forced by the Bank of Spain to 
diversify risks and reduce its credit exposure to Mondragon cooperatives. As a positive effect, the 
collapse of FED has not led to the fall of the corporate bank.  
  
Social Council  
While other Mondragon cooperatives opt for a clear differentiation between the functions of the 
Governing Council and the Social Council; the cooperatives of the Fagor group developed a 
distinctive culture that gave more weight to the Social Council. This led to greater confusion and 
duality between the social and the executive channels. 
At FED it was common for many management decisions to go to the Social Council for consultation 
and approval. An example is the purchase of the Polish company Wrozamet in 1999: 
"When the debate about the purchase of Wrozamet came up, the president said: "This 
decision is going to be made together by the Governing Council and the Social Council. And 
the president and other members of the Social Council are going to go to Poland and you will 
meet with the members of the Solidarity union and they will come here and meet with you and 
you will explain how this works and then we will have the technical and economic debate, to 
see what numbers come out and then the social debate. The Social Council's report was 
23 
 
favourable on the purchase of Wrozamet, it was taken to the Assembly and 82% voted yes". 
(FED Manager and Member of the SC). 
According to the interviewees, decisions that should be made by the Governing Council were 
actually taken by the Social Council that put pressure on the Governing Council even in decisions 
such as the dismissal of the CEO, generating a culture where rights prevailed over responsibilities 
 "You have to go back to February 24, 2006 that is when they cut off the CEO's head. The 
decision to dismiss the CEO is (theoretically) the Governing Council's... and in the General 
Assembly the president of the Social Council, [name and last name removed], took the stand 
…, saying that they, the Social Council, were the ones who removed the CEO... It was 
unsustainable, who's steering this ship? ...... It didn't make sense... a place where the 
decisions are not made among the experts...” (FED Manager) 
Effectively giving decision-making power to the Social Council, reflected the management's priority 
for maintaining social peace. Some interviewees pointed out that some members of the Social 
Council had more influence than some CEOs: 
"With the purchase of Wrozamet, I remember perfectly well that [name omitted] was the head 
of the Social Council at that time. She was the real power. She was the one who ruled for 
about 25 years, she was a woman with a strong political and union position and with a very 
important team of that type around her. …The strength of the Social Council here in the 
Fagor Group is not remotely similar to that of the rest of the Mondragon group cooperatives. 
…. Here the Social Council had a lot of strength and the rights, social conquest, were much 
more important. There was always talk of rights." (FED Manager and Member of GC and 
SC) 
"The Social Council was so strong that it could make the executive and the Governing 
Council stop projects. The Social Council had a very big influence, very big. I don't know 
how to explain why the Social Council had so much power. I was totally amazed at times. 
Maybe it had so much power because of the people on the Social Council. Because of their 
personal leadership.”  (FED Manager) 
As was the case with the control exercised by the General Assembly and the Governing Council, the 
type of control that the Social Council exercised over top management was often aspects of day-to-
day operational management, issues that should have been solved in lower bodies of the company.  
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"In the end you get used to "I want to talk to the manager". The Social Council members went 
to the manager's office every day for matters that they could have discussed with their direct 
superiors. Why do you involve the manager? What does the manager know about whether to 
extend this person’s contract or not? The manager does not understand because they are 
dealing with other things, strategy issues." (FED Manager) 
As in the case of Governing Council members, Social Council members often lacked the skills to 
conduct some of their tasks. One of the functions of the Social Council in FED is to communicate 
managerial decisions and convey information downward. Kasmir (1996) found that Social Council 
members were often unable to interpret the information by themselves. According to our 
interviewees, this problem persisted until the end of the firm. 
In addition, workers’ representatives in FED’s Social Council and Governing Council stressed that 
cooperatives should give them access to external independent advice, such as professional lawyers 
and management accountants, to assist rank and file workers that serve as board members. This 
demand is not new and Social Council members of FED interviewed by Kasmir (1996, 137) 
criticized the “lack of access to outside professionals impeded workers’ ability to exercise their 
democratic rights to manage their firms”. 
 
Conclusion and Discussion  
The research shows that it is too simplistic to blame the failure of FED simply on external factors. 
While recognizing the importance of the external challenges that  contributed to the demise of FED, 
as previous research highlights (Alzola et al. 2015; Errasti et al. 2016; Arando and Bengoa, 2018), 
our paper shows that internal factors linked to the cooperative’s governance system and culture 
influenced key failed strategic decisions and reduced the capability of the firm to reverse the decline 
caused by external factors. 
The research shows that democratic governing bodies can slow down or indefinitely postpone 
painful decisions concerning the closure of factories and units that lose money but employ worker 
owners. Painful measures that could have saved part of the firm weren’t taken or even proposed by 
management to the General Assembly, since managers knew in advance that the worker owners 
would vote them down.  
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This research also contributes to the literature by allowing a better understanding of how 
organisational factors, such as organisational size and internationalisation through the takeover of 
foreign subsidiaries pose challenges for the cooperative model of democratic governance. 
Participants in the study believed that the level of direct democracy at FED is ill-suited to large 
multinational cooperatives. The application of the one- member -one vote principle in massive 
General Assemblies, with thousands of cooperative members that have to vote on complex strategic 
decisions they do not fully understand, is questioned by most of the interviewees. Given that many 
other Mondragon cooperatives are economically successful and some of them are also growing with 
over 4,000 working members, this growth may also be the seed of future governance problems like 
those found in FED. In fact, some interviewees highlight that similar conflictual and unproductive 
General Assemblies and subsequent mass resignations of Governing Councils are also taking place 
in other large Mondragon cooperatives, and they suggest large cooperatives should limit the power 
of General Assemblies and move to a stronger form of representative democracy.   
In a largely conceptual paper Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) draw on both agency theory and 
stewardship theory to highlight an important paradox that boards face, namely that they need to both 
control and support management. They argue that if boards focus too strongly on either of these roles 
at the expense of the other it can lead to organisational problems. They propose that if boards are too 
critical and unsupportive of managers they may get trapped into defensive spirals of behaviour, 
which lead to processes of organisational decline. The case of FED provides evidence to support this 
proposal. In this destructive spiral, FED’s Governing Council, heavily influenced by the Social 
Council, was very critical of management proposals and fired the CEO in 2006; afterwards other 
managers resigned and one year later there was an “en masse” resignation of the entire Governing 
Council. This destructive spiral generated fear among subsequent managers that then tried to 
maintain social peace by keeping proposals that might be opposed by worker members off the 
agenda that lead to a 'reverse dominance hierarchy' (Basterretxea et al., 2019) and contributed to 
FED’s demise. Nevertheless, some interviewees felt that a 'reverse dominance hierarchy' is part of 
the raison d’etre of the cooperative model itself. Thus, the challenge is how to make this dominance 
and the voice of the members in the Governing Council and General Assembly work more 
effectively to supervise and guide managers. Some interviewees highlighted the example of ULMA, 
that has grown through spin-offs and creating new cooperatives, each of a size that can make 
democratic governance easier. A recent paper (Bretos et al. 2019) also offers interesting examples 
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from Fagor Arrasate and Fagor Ederlan, that have achieved the involvement of members at all levels 
in the discussion and elaboration of strategic plans through several mini councils. 
Our study also contributes to the scholarly literature when cooperative membership is restricted to 
certain groups. In the case of FED, membership was not offered to the foreign subsidiaries the co-
operative took over.  In addition, the one-member one-vote principle generated a General Assembly 
and Governing Council composed mainly of industrial workers and technicians from FED’s Basque 
factories. As a result, the interests of other key functional departments, such as marketing, and 
foreign subsidiaries were either under-represented or not represented at all. Interviewees believed 
this led to the downsizing of uncompetitive domestic plants being postponed and to a progressive 
loss of competitiveness. 
Another key lesson from the experience of FED relates to the competency of worker board members 
to understand and act on the information they are presented with in large complex cooperatives. 
Giving all the information is not the solution, if cooperative members can not understand it. Indeed, 
it can create apathy and the rubber stamping of management proposals, unless workers feel their 
direct interests are threatened, when it may lead to greater involvement and conflict. According to 
our informants, thinking that training for business literacy and efforts to improve communication in 
simpler formats can equip worker board members to address complex economic and strategic 
problems facing multinationals like FED is naive.  
The failure of FED made many other Mondragon cooperatives think that this competency gap can 
not be filled by training alone. Thus, a growing number of voices are asking for the 
professionalization of Governing Councils. While the nomination of board members based on 
meritocracy limits some of the governance problems of cooperatives, it also generates Governing 
Councils that do not reflect the plurality of interests of the members from different backgrounds. 
Professionalising totally the Governing Councils, as informants have told us that some Mondragon 
cooperatives are doing, is likely to mean that expertise is acquired at the expense of representation of 
certain groups of workers.  
A potential solution to this governance problem as suggested by some of managers interviewed is to 
include independent board members on the Governing Councils. The appointment of independent 
directors has been possible since the approval of the Basque Cooperatives Act in 1993. However, 
FED and most of the Mondragon cooperatives have not made use of this opportunity. One possible 
reason is that bringing in expert independent directors on to the board is costly, and Mondragon 
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cooperatives’ practice of not paying the members of the Governing Council for their role makes it 
difficult to attract professionals who could play this role. Nevertheless, as the failure of FED 
highlights, having poor Governing Councils can be far more costly if the cooperative fails.  
As a result of FED's failure, the Basque government is drafting a new cooperative law (Gobierno 
Vasco, 2018) that, among other things, proposes to professionalise the governing councils and 
encourage the use of independent members. The draft bill increases the maximum percentage of 
independent members from one quarter to one third of the governing council. In order to make this 
position attractive, the draft bill contemplates payment for independent board members, which is 
proportionate to the cooperative's importance, its current economic situation, and, above all, the 
skills and experience that the independent board members bring.  
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Figure 1. Firms belonging to the Fagor Electrodomésticos Group in 2012 Ownership% 
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